Up until the late twentieth century, philosophers have thought there is a close conceptual tie between justice and desert. In recent work, however, it has become common for philosophers to deny such a connection. My research defends the idea that there is a close conceptual tie between justice and desert. My primary research program stems from my doctoral thesis on desert. In chapter 1, I argue that many quick dismissals of the claim that desert has a significant role in our thinking about justice are in fact based on mistaken preconceptions of desert-based approaches to thinking about justice. I argue, with misunderstandings cleared, a theory of justice which recognizes considerations of desert does a better job at capturing our intuitions and thinking about justice than competitor theories, a claim substantiated by the rest of the thesis. In chapter 2, I argue the many questions often seen as barriers to further theorizing about justice and desert, questions pertaining to the nature and normative force of desert, are not barriers, and that there is nothing at all strange or mysterious about the claim ‘giving the deserving what they deserve is a fitting response to their desert’. Drawing on the work of the British Ethical Intuitionists, I argue that fittingness is its own category in the normative domain in addition to the familiar deontic and evaluative, that desert is a species of fittingness, and that it is simply not true that desert cannot ground obligations. If this is correct, then many of the main objections to a desert-based approach to justice will have been based on a false dichotomy. Chapter 3 argues in favor of a theory of economic desert where effort and contribution are the bases of desert and what is deserved is income and not welfare or levels of well-being. Chapter 4 then argues the view that others’ pro tanto duty is also a basis of desert invites confusion, and that justice is concerned not only with desert (along with other considerations, such as needs and perhaps fairness) but also with a respect for rights. Chapter 5 then argues those who claim no one can deserve to suffer do not fully understand the implications of their view, and that once the desertist or retributivist position is properly understood, they too will see that they have reason to become desertists and that their view only seems plausible because it leaves many questions about desert unanswered. My doctoral thesis left many issues unresolved which I hope to take up in future work. In my thesis, I argued that fittingness is its own category within the normative domain and that desert is a species of fittingness. Whether fittingness can be satisfactorily explained in terms of reasons is one topic I hope to explore further. Another issue I hope to explore is whether justice is fundamentally comparative or non-comparative. In my recent article, I argued there is a way to understand fairness as comparative desert and suggested justice might be fundamentally non-comparative. In future work I hope to explore the issue of whether justice is fundamentally comparative or non-comparative in relation to the law(s) against wrongful discrimination. (One question of particular interest is, what is it to subordinate certain social groups, to fail to give them equal standing? Is it a case of failing to treat them as they deserve?) There are also the further complexities between desert, blame, and forgiveness. Some see forgiveness as a hinderance to justice. I want to explore the concept of forgiveness in relation to our practices of holding responsible. Others claim blame has a pernicious effect on our public discourse and that we also ought to give up our practice of applying punishment to morally condemn wrongdoers. I hope to explore alternatives without giving up on justice. (Notice, immigrants and migrants often unjustly fall on the wrong side of blame.) In future work, I hope to explore the role of equality and rights in political discourse.